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Abstract: Cloud storage has a long string of merits but at the same time, poses
many challenges on data integrity and privacy. A cloud data auditing protocol, which
enables a cloud server to prove the integrity of stored ﬁles to a veriﬁer, is a powerful
tool for secure cloud storage. Wang et al. proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing
protocol, however, Worku et al. found the protocol is seriously insecure and proposed
an improvement to remedy the weakness. In this paper, unfortunately, we demonstrate
that the new protocol due to Worku et al. fails to achieve soundness and obtains
merely limited privacy. Speciﬁcally, we show even deleting all the ﬁles of a data owner, a
malicious cloud server is able to generate a response to a challenge without being caught
by TPA in their enhanced but unrealistic security model. Worse still, the protocol is
insecure even in a correct security model. For privacy, a dishonest veriﬁer can tell
which ﬁle is stored on the cloud. Solutions to eﬃcient public auditing mechanisms with
perfect privacy protection are still worth exploring.
Key Words: Cloud storage, Data integrity, Privacy-preserving, Security analysis
Category: H.2, H.3.7, H.5.4

1

Introduction

Cloud storage is becoming increasingly popular because of a laundry list of
advantages of this kind of novel storage model. Currently, many cloud storage
services such as Amazon S3, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Skydrive have attracted millions of users all over the world, including individuals and organizations.
The ﬂexibility and on demand manner of cloud storage brings a lot of appealing
beneﬁts over traditional storage approach, say, relief of the burden of storage
management, avoiding capital expenditure on hardware, software and personnel
maintenance, access to data with independent geographical locations [Armbrust
et al. 2010]. More and more users would like to outsource their data to remote
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cloud servers seeking to reduce the maintenance and storage cost such that they
can focus more on their core competencies.
Despite of a long string of merits, cloud storage does trigger many challenging
security problems [Wei et al. 2014]. Since data owners lose the control over their
data, a major concern of cloud users is whether their data keeps virgin since some
important data as well as conﬁdential ﬁles may be hosted on the cloud. Two main
reasons may lead to the loss of data constantly [Wang et al. 2010, Wang et al.
2011]. Firstly, frequent data access increases the probability of disk corruption,
but cloud servers would try to hide data loss incidents in order to maintain
their reputations. Secondly, cloud servers are not necessarily fully trusted and
consequently, malicious servers might discard the data that have not been or are
rarely accessed for monetary reasons. As a result, a strong evidence that their
data accommodated on cloud keeps unchanged and is not being tampered with
or partially deleted is highly essential for cloud users.
However, traditional cryptographic primitives for data integrity checking such
as hash functions and digital signatures cannot be applied to cloud storage scenario directly because a copy of original message is required in the veriﬁcation of
these technologies, while the data owner or a veriﬁer does not keep such a copy in
cloud environment. Retrieving the entire ﬁle from cloud for integrity veriﬁcation
is unpractical since the data stored on cloud is massive, or even big data. In 2007,
Ateniese et al. proposed the notion of provable data possession(PDP) [Atenisese et al. 2007, Ateniese et al. 2011] for validating data integrity over remote
servers to address this issue. In a typical PDP system, a data owner generates
some metadata for a ﬁle, and then stores ﬁles together with the corresponding
metadata to cloud. The data owner can check the integrity of stored data via a
challenge-response protocol with the remote server. To generate a proof that the
server hosts the ﬁle in its original form, the server computes a response using the
data owner’s challenge, the challenged data blocks and the metadata. The data
owner validates the ﬁle is not being tampered with by checking the correctness
of the response. At the same time, Juels et al. presented the concept of proof of
retrievability (POR) [Jules et al. 2007], in which both error-correcting codes and
spot-checking are employed to achieve the properties of integrity and retrievability of ﬁles. Subsequently, Shachem and Waters proposed compact proof of retrievability and constructed an elegant scheme from BLS short signature [Shacham et
al. 2008, Shacham et al. 2012]. This construction [Shacham et al. 2008, Shacham
et al. 2012] has been widely used as a building block to construct cloud data auditing protocols with additional features due to the beautiful properties of BLS
signature scheme. Subsequently, PDP became a research hotspot and a variety of
PDP schemes along with their analysis and improvement were proposed [Wang
et al. 2010, Wang et al.2013, Yu, Niu et al. 2014, Yu, Ni et al. 2014]. Among
which, public veriﬁability [Wang et al. 2010], batch auditing [Wang et al. 2010],
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and data privacy against veriﬁers [Wang et al.2013] are three advanced features
of cloud data auditing for practical cloud storage purpose. In 2010, Wang et al.
extended the protocol due to Shacham and Waters [Shacham et al. 2008] and
proposed privacy-preserving public auditing scheme [Wang et al. 2010] for data storage security. However, Worku et al. [Worku et al. 2014] found that the
scheme [Wang et al. 2010] is vulnerable to attacks from malicious cloud server
and outside attackers regarding to storage correctness. To remedy the security
weakness of this scheme, Worku et al. described an improvement in [Worku et al.
2014] which was claimed as being secure, with better eﬃciency and can support
batch auditing. They also provided a comprehensive security analysis on storage
correctness and privacy-preserving guarantee.
Contribution. In this paper, we show the construction in [Worku et al. 2014]
is not secure in their security model or in a correct security model. To be speciﬁc,
with the aid of signature queries, a malicious cloud server could generate a valid
response to a challenge from a third party auditor (TPA) even the server has
deleted all the ﬁles of a user or has corrupted the ﬁle. Regarding the data privacy,
what the scheme can achieve is that an adversary cannot recover the entire ﬁle
from the auditing process, which is similar to the one-wayness of encryption. We
will show that it cannot achieve the IND-privacy introduced recently by Fan et
al. [Fan et al. 2013].

2

Review of privacy-preserving public auditing scheme

In this section, we ﬁrstly review some preliminaries used in the paper and then
recall the privacy-preserving public auditing scheme in [Worku et al. 2014].
Bilinear Map [Boneh et al. 2001]. G and GT denote two multiplicative
cyclic groups of the same prime order p. e denotes a bilinear map that for all
g, h ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp∗ , e(g a , hb ) = e(g, h)ab . For such kind of bilinear map, there
exists a computable algorithm that can compute e eﬃciently and e(g, g) = 1.
Notation. The data owner preprocesses the outsourced ﬁles by dividing
each ﬁle F into n blocks F = (m1 , m2 , · · · , mn ) for mi ∈ Zp (i = 1, · · · , n).
H() : {0, 1}∗ → G denotes a secure map-to-point hash function employed in
BLS signature [Boneh et al. 2001] while h() : G → Zp represents a secure hash
function which maps elements of G uniformly to Zp . πkey : {0, 1}log2 (n) × K →
{0, 1}log2 (n) and fkey : {0, 1}∗ × K → Zp denote a pseudorandom permutation
and a pseudorandom function respectively, where key belongs to a key space K.
Scheme Review. The privacy-preserving public auditing scheme in [Worku
et al. 2014] consists of the following algorithms.
KeyGen(1k ). The data owner ﬁrst generates a random signing key pair (ssk,
spk), and then picks x ∈ Zp , u ∈ G and computes v = g x ∈ G. The secret
key is sk = (x, ssk) while the public parameter is pk = (u, v, g, spk).
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SigGen(sk,F). The data owner chooses a random element name in Zp as the
name of ﬁle F = {mi }1≤i≤n and computes the ﬁle tag as
t = name||Sigssk (name)
with signature on name. Then for each mi ∈ Zp , computes a signature σi as
σi = (H(i) · umi )x ∈ G(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Finally, the data owner stores {F, φ = {σi }1≤i≤n , t} on the cloud and deletes
the ﬁles and its corresponding set of signatures from local storage.
Challenge(1k ). When performing the auditing protocol, TPA retrieves the ﬁle
tag t for F and checks the validity with spk, and quits if fail. If t is correct,
TPA picks random c, k1 , k2 in Zp and sends chal = (c, k1 , k2 ) to the cloud
server where k1 , k2 are keys for pseudorandom permutation π and pseudorandom function f for each auditing task.
ProofGen(F, φ, chal). Upon receiving the challenge chal, the cloud server ﬁrst
determines the challenging subset I = {sj }(1 ≤ j ≤ c) of set [1, n] by
computing sj = πk1 (j) and the corresponding coeﬃcients by evaluating vsj =
fk2 (j)(1 ≤ j ≤ c). For i ∈ I, the cloud server picks a random r ∈ Zp ,
sc

calculates R = ur ∈ G and μ = μ∗ + rh(R), σ =
σivi , where μ∗ =
i=s1
sc
i=s1 vi mi . Finally, the cloud server sends the proof P = (μ, σ, R) to TPA.
VerifyProof(pk, chal, P ). Upon receiving the (μ, σ, R) from the server, TPA
computes sj = πk1 (j) and vsj = fk2 (j)(1 ≤ j ≤ c), and checks if
?

e(σ, g) = e(

sc


H(i)vi · uμ · R−h(R) , v).

i=s1

3

Security analysis of the scheme

A privacy-preserving public auditing scheme [Worku et al. 2014] should provide
the properties of soundness and privacy. Thus, two kinds of adversaries are involved in this kind of protocols. The ﬁrst one aims to attack the soundness while
the second one tries to attack the privacy. In the following, we will discuss the
security of the scheme in [Worku et al. 2014] under these attacks.
3.1

Soundness

A scheme is sound if any cheating prover that convinces the veriﬁcation algorithm
that it is storing a ﬁle is actually storing that ﬁle. Ateniese et al. [Atenisese
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et al. 2007] and Shacham-Waters [Shacham et al. 2008] formalized this notion
by describing a security model for soundness. Worku et al.’s model [Worku et
al. 2014] provides the adversary full access to the information stored on the
cloud server. In the soundness game, the adversary is intended to play the role
of a malicious cloud server without the challenged ﬁle, who interacts with a
challenger playing the role of TPA. The security model for soundness described
in [Worku et al. 2014] is as follows.
Setup. The challenger generates a keypair (pk, sk) by running KeyGen algorithm and provides pk to the adversary.
Phase 1. The challenger computes a signature for each block made by the
adversary adaptively.
Challenge. The challenger challenges the adversary for proof and at the same
time, interacts with normal execution protocol for data integrity check.
Phase 2. Phase 1 will be repeated for other blocks indices diﬀerent from those
already included in the challenge.
Output. The adversary outputs a proof that can pass the veriﬁcation.
In the following, we show that with the help of signature queries, an adversary, i.e. a malicious cloud server, who has deleted the entire challenged ﬁle and
the signatures corresponding to each block of this ﬁle, could generate a valid response without being detected by the TPA in the auditing process. The details
are as follows.
Setup. The challenger generates a keypair (pk, sk) by running KeyGen algorithm and provides pk to the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary makes two ﬁles F = (m1 , m2 , · · · , mn ) and F  =
(m1 , m2 , · · · , mn ), and then requests two signature queries on mi and mi for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and get two signatures σi and σi .
Challenge. The challenger checks the integrity of his ﬁle, say F ∗ = (m∗1 , · · · ,
∗
mn ) by sending a challenge chal∗ = (c∗ , k1∗ , k2∗ ). Note that this challenge on F ∗
never appeared in previous stages.
Phase 2. The adversary determines the challenging set I ∗ = {s∗j } by computing s∗j = πk1∗ (j) for (1 ≤ j ≤ c∗ ). Then for 1 ≤ j ≤ c∗ , the challenger makes
a ﬁle in which the value of the s∗j -th block is 0, and queries the signature of this
block. Finally, the adversary obtains c∗ signatures σs0∗ for 1 ≤ j ≤ c∗ .
j
Output. The adversary generates a response to chal∗ in the following way.
1. Calculate the coeﬃcient set of vs∗j where vs∗j = fk2∗ (j)(1 ≤ j ≤ c∗ ).
∗

2. Pick a random r∗ ∈ Zp , and calculate R∗ = ur ∈ G.
3. Choose c∗ random elements m∗1 , m∗2 , · · · , m∗c∗ from Zp .
c∗
4. Compute μ = μ∗ + r∗ h(R∗ ), where μ∗ = j=1 vs∗j m∗j .
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∗

5. Compute σ =

c

j=1

1

∗

vs∗

(σs0∗j · [( σσi ) mi −mi ]mj )


j

i

.

6. Send P ∗ = (μ, σ, R∗ ) to TPA.
The correctness of the forged response is illustrated below.
∗

e(σ, g) = e(

c


j=1

(σs0∗j · [(

1
∗
σi mi −m
 m∗ vs
i ] j ) j , g)
)

σi

∗

= e(

c


j=1

∗

v∗
σs0∗j , g) sj

c
m∗
j

σi mi −m
vs∗

i , g) j
· e( (  )
σi
j=1

∗

= e(

c


j=1
∗

= e(

c


c


j sj
σi

·
e(  , g) mi −mi
σ
i
j=1
m vs
c
j

e(H(i)umi , v) mij−m

i
]
·
[

mi , v)
e(H(i)u
j=1

∗

= e(

∗ ∗

∗

v∗
H(s∗j ) sj , v)

j=1
c


∗

v∗
H(s∗j ) sj , v)

j=1

·

c


= e(

e(u

mi −mi

, v)

∗
m∗
j vs j
mi −m
i

j=1
c∗


∗

c


m∗ v ∗

∗

v∗
H(s∗j ), v) sj

v∗
H(s∗j ) sj , v)

· e(uj=1

∗
m∗
j vs

j

, v)

j=1
∗

= e(

c


vs∗j

, v) · e(uμ−r

vs∗j

uμ (R∗ )−h(R ) , v)

H(s∗j )

∗

h(R∗ )

, v)

j=1
∗

= e(

c


H(s∗j )

∗

j=1

In fact, the security model in [Worku et al. 2014] is unrealistic in the sense
there is no a scheme that can be proven secure in this model. The reason is,
the adversary is allowed to query signatures after he receives a challenge. Thus,
the adversary could produce some random blocks and generate a valid response
for these blocks as a valid response. The security proof in [Worku et al. 2014]
describes only outside adversaries since signature queries are not involved. In
addition, the cloud server can pollute stored ﬁles even in the correct security
model, say the model due to Ateniese et al. [Atenisese et al. 2007, Ateniese et
al. 2011], which does not contain the phase 2 queries. To be speciﬁc, in phase 1,
the adversary requests two signature queries on mi and mi , two blocks in two
distinct ﬁles but with the same position i, and receives two signatures σi and
1

σi . Then the adversary computes ( σσi ) mi −mi as the user’s secret key ux . Now
i
the cloud server is able to modify any block mk to mk + Δmk , and generate
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its signature by computing σk · ( σσi ) mi −mi . With these values, the server can
i
produce a valid response without original blocks.
3.2



Privacy

Regarding ”data privacy”, it seems that there is no a widely accepted notion to
describe this property. The privacy notion is not being formally deﬁned in [Worku
et al. 2014] yet and from the part of privacy-preserving analysis in [Worku et al.
2014], we can see privacy here states that TPA cannot derive the entire ﬁle during
the process of auditing. This property is true since μ∗ is blinded by a random
value r chosen by the server and keeps unknown to TPA, as μ = μ∗ + rh(R).
This kind of privacy is similar to one-wayness of encryption and we argue that it
is not strong enough in some scenarios say, in the context of dictionary attack. A
recently proposed notion of ”IND-privacy” [Fan et al. 2013] captures the essence
of data privacy well in the sense that IND-privacy guarantees that TPA cannot
obtain any information of the ﬁles via the integrity checking. Although it is
claimed that ”no information of μ∗ ” will be leaked to TPA in [Worku et al.
2014], in the following, we show that the scheme [Worku et al. 2014] cannot
achieve IND-privacy.
We ﬁrstly review the security model of IND-privacy described in [Fan et al.
2013].
IND-Privacy. The data privacy for auditing proofs via an indistinguishability
game between a simulator S (the prover) and an adversary A (the veriﬁer).
Setup: The simulator runs KeyGen to generate (sk, pk) and passes pk to the
adversary A.
Phase 1: A is allowed to make signature queries. To make such a query, A
selects a ﬁle F and sends it to S. S generates a ﬁle tag t, signatures π = {σi }
for each block of F , and then returns (t, π) to A.
Phase 2: A chooses two distinct ﬁles F0 , F1 that has not appeared in Phase 1,
and sends them to S. S calculates (t0 , π0 ) and (t1 , π1 ) by running the SigGen
algorithm. S then tosses a coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends tb back to A. A generates
a challenge chal and sends it to S. S generates a proof P based on (Fb , tb , σb )
and A’s challenge chal and then sends P to A. Finally, A outputs a bit b as the
guess of b.
Deﬁne the advantage of the adversary A as
AdvA (λ) = | Pr[b = b] − 1/2|.
Definition 1. An auditing protocol has indistinguishability if for any polynomial time algorithm A, AdvA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter
λ.
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Below we show that the scheme [Worku et al. 2014] cannot achieve indistinguishability. Let A denote an IND adversary which works as follows (see Fig.
1).
– A chooses two distinct ﬁles F0 = (m01 , · · · , m0n ) and F1 = (m11 , · · · , m1n )
such that m0i = m1i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– S generates (t0 , {σ0i }) and (t1 , {σ1i }) for F0 and F1 respectively. S then
chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends tb back to A.
– After receiving the tag tb , A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I .
– S computes and sends to A the response P = (μ, σb , R).

– A computes μ0 = i∈I (νi m0i ) and checks if


e( (H(i))νi uμ0 , v) = e(σb , g).
i∈I

If it is true, return 0; otherwise, return 1.
Probability Analysis. If b = 0, then σb = σ0 and the equation

∗
e(σ0 , g) = e( H(i)vi uμ0 , v)
i∈I

always holds. On the other hand, if b = 1, then σb = σ1 and

∗
e(σ0 , g) = e( H(i)vi uμ1 , v)
i∈I

holds only when
μ∗0 (=

sc

i=s1

vi m0i ) =

μ∗1 (=

sc


vi m1i ),

i=s1

which happens only with probability 1/p for randomly selected {νi }i∈I since
m0i = m1i for all i ∈ {s1 , · · · , sc }. Therefore, A has an overwhelming probability
to guess the value of b correctly.

4

Conclusion

In this paper, we analyzed the security of a privacy-preserving public auditing
scheme [Worku et al. 2014] proposed recently and showed that it fails to achieve
soundness in their security model and achieved limited privacy. Constructing
public auditing protocols with perfect privacy-preserving is still worth the eﬀort
to put on in the near future.
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B

Generate two distinct ﬁles:
F0 = (m01 , · · · , m0n )
F1 = (m11 , · · · , m1n )

F 0 , F1

−−−−−−−−→ Compute (t0 , {σ0i }) for F0
and (t1 , {σ1i }) for F1
Randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}
t

b
←−−−−
−−−−

chal

chal = {c, k1 , k2 }

−−−−−−−−→ Compute sj (1 ≤ j ≤ c)
R = ur
sc

μ∗b =
vi mbi
i=s1

μb = μ∗b + rh(R)
sc

vi
σbi
σb =
μb ,σb ,R

Compute μ∗0 =
Check if
?

e(σb , g) = e(



sc

i=s1

i=s1

←−−−−−−−−
vi m0i ,
∗

H(i)vi uμ0 , v).

i∈I

If true, output 0; Otherwise, output 1.

Figure 1: Indistinguishability analysis on the auditing protocol [Worku et al.
2014]

References
[Atenisese et al. 2007] Ateniese, G., Burns, R. C., Curtmola, R., Herring, J., Kissner,
L., Peterson, Z.N.J., Song, D.: ”Provable data possession at untrusted stores”; Proc.
of ACM CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, Oct.29-Nov.2, 2007, 598–609.
[Armbrust et al. 2010] Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griﬃth,R., Joseph, A., Katz, R., Konwinski, A., Lee, G.: ”A view of cloud computing”; Communications of the ACM,
53, 4, (2010) 50–58.
[Ateniese et al. 2011] Ateniese, G., Burns, R. C., Curtmola, R., Herring, J., Kissner, L.,
Peterson, Z.N.J., Song, D.: ”Remote data checking using provable data possession”;
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Security, 14, 1, (2011) 12.
[Boneh et al. 2001] Boneh, D., Lynn, B., Shacham, H.: ”Short signatures from the weil
pairing”; Proc. of ASIACRYPT 2001, Gold Coast, Australia, 2001, 514–532.
[Fan et al. 2013] Fan, X., Yang, G., Mu, Y., Yu, Y.: ”On Indistinguishability in Remote Data Integrity Checking”; The Computer Journal, (2013) doi: 10.1093/comjnl/bxt137.
[Jules et al. 2007] Juels, A., Kaliski, B. S.: ”PORs: proofs of retrievability for large
ﬁles”; Proc. of ACM CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, Oct.29-Nov.2, 2007,
584–597.
[Shacham et al. 2008] Shacham,H., Waters, B.: ”Compact proofs of retrievability”;
Proc. of Asiacrypt 2008, Sydney, Australia, Jan. 8–11, 2008, 90–107.
[Shacham et al. 2012] Shacham,H., Waters, B.: ”Compact proofs of retrievability”;
Journal of Cryptology, 26, 3, (2013) 442–483.

482

Liu H., Chen L., Davar Z., Pour M.R.: Insecurity ...

[Wang et al. 2010] Wang, C., Ren, K., Lou, W., Li, J.: ”Toward publicly auditable
secure cloud data storage services”, IEEE Network, 24, (2010) 19–24.
[Wang et al. 2010] Wang, C., Wang, Q., Ren, K., Lou, W.: ”Privacy-preserving public
auditing for data storage security in cloud computing”; Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM
2010, San Diego, CA, 14-19 March, 2010, 525–533.
[Wang et al. 2011] Wang, Q., Wang, C., Ren, K., Lou, W., Li, J.: ”Enabling public
audibility and data dynamics for storage security in cloud computing”; IEEE Trans.
Parallel Distrib. Syst., 22, 2011, 847–859.
[Wang et al.2013] Wang, C., Chow, S.S., Wang, Q., Ren, K., Lou, W.: ”Privacypreserving public auditing for secure cloud storage”; IEEE Transactions on Computers, 62, (2013) 362–375.
[Worku et al. 2014] Worku,S.G., Xu, C., Zhao, J., He, X.: ”Secure and eﬃcient privacypreserving public auditing scheme for cloud storage”; Computers & Electrical Engineering, 40, 5, ( 2014) 1703–1713.
[Wei et al. 2014] Wei, L., Zhu, H., Cao, Z., Dong, X., Jia, W., Chen,Y. , Vasilakos,
A.V.: ”Security and privacy for storage and computation in cloud computing”; Information Sciences, 258, 10, (2014) 371–386.
[Yu, Niu et al. 2014] Yu Y., Niu, L., Yang G., Mu Y., Susilo W.: ”On the security of
auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage”; Future Generation Comp. Syst. 30,
(2014) 127–132.
[Yu, Ni et al. 2014] Yu Y., Ni J., Au M. H., Liu, H., Wang, H., Xu C.,: ”Improved
security of a dynamic remote data possession checking protocol for cloud storage”;
Expert Syst. Appl. 41,17, (2014) 7789–7796.

